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Abstract The comment discusses M. Slote's view on empathy as presented in his
paper BThe Many Faces of Empathy .^ It is asked whether three forms of empathy he
portrays are three separable concepts or three variants of the same concept of empathy.
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In BThe Many Faces of Empathy^ Michael Slote treats two issues. He deals with
empathy’s role in the theory of knowledge and with empathy’s role in speech acts.
As it seems to me, he presents, all in all, three different faces of empathy, respectively
in sections 1, 2, and 3–4.
In section 1 Slote understands empathy as Ba direct way of knowing about other
minds^. By doing so he says nothing about the affective element involved in empathy.
This may mean that empathy is understood as cognitive rather than affective. Moreover,
the kind of objects of knowledge grasped through empathy or the kind of acts resulting
from empathy is not specified either. This makes room for a counterintuitive way of
understanding empathy. For instance, an exceptionally sophisticated torturer or some
other psychopath who efficiently control others because they perfectly read in their
victims’ minds acquire a direct knowledge about other minds. Yet, neither the
torturer not the psychopath is standardly considered as an empathic individual. They
are both devoid of caring about others. While they are or can be extremely intelligent,
they lack exactly the ability (necessary) to empathize even if they can coldly know about
other minds.
When Slote says that empathy Bhelps us learn facts about the world^, he expands its
meaning even more. Does it mean that these facts are not of special character, say,
being directed at other persons’ feelings? (Slote says that Bempathy helps to put us
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Bfeeling^ element). This looks as if empathy is a way of knowing about other’s minds
and other facts of the world independently of what results, if anything at all, from
empathizing with them. Because empathy is a general way of learning about the world
while several emotions are contributing to one’s knowledge too, but each of them in a
specific way, would then be empathy a cognitive genus of what several emotions are
just cognitive species?
Example Slote gives refers to osmosis and/or introjection or contagion rather than to
empathy. He speaks about a child who learns fearing snakes because he empathically
pick up on parents’ fear of snake. If empathy is indeed such an uncritical Bway of
learning about the world^ (children have no Bindependent reason to doubt^ as adults
do, see below), its epistemic character is limited. Take a child who fears travelling in a
plane because his parent does so. His learning can be misleading him in his life and if
we call empathy the way he acquired his knowledge in this respect, its harming role is
to be conjectured. This is what Slote hints at when he speaks about (paranoiac)
identification with or appropriation of other people’s belief or attitude. There is not,
however, a clear divide between such distinct phenomena as paranoia and psychopathy,
on the one hand, and empathy, on the other. Traditionally empathy has been understood
as morally beneficial and as exclusive with psychopathy. Therefore, Bempathy [that]
serve us badly^ and, accordingly, empathy not Bfully reliable^ is a concept that unless
misleading should be better spelled out. Otherwise how one can subscribe to the view
that Bempathy can (often) help us identify those who need our help more immediately
or quickly than other modes of cognition, and this clearly makes empathy epistemically
relevant to the moral life^? One of two things: either empathy is morally relevant and
then cannot be the same as getting into the heads of other people unqualifiedly and for
any purpose whatsoever, or it is Ba direct way of knowing about other minds^
regardless of my intention stemming from empathizing but then empathy is relevant
to moral only contingently. If Slote insists on Bthe acquisition of empirical knowledge
or justified beliefs about the world^, it should be clarified in what way acquired beliefs
are justified - surely not always in the sense of being accurate or appropriate - and
whether the acquisition is or is not essentially and inseparably related to undertaking an
act or being motivated to act in a special way.
In section 2 Slote speaks about Bbeing warmed by warmth or chilled by cold-hearted
(or heartless)^ as Ban empathic process^. This is another face of empathy:
Bempathically registered warmth and chill as, respectively, states of moral approval
and disapproval^. Empathy looks now as an autonomous and (always?) right aware-
ness of what is going on in the world. Whereas in section 1 empathy was about fully
accepting or adopting one’s attitude, uncritically and at risk of acquiring a false
conviction, here, in section 2, empathy is about decoding the meaning of Bsomeone’s
actions or attitude by empathically taking in the warmth or coldness that person is
displaying in their actions^.
In section 3 a third face of empathy amounts to Brecogniz[ing] the feelings of
others^. Slote applies the concept of empathy so understood to Bwhat people say ,^
which, in turn, is manifest of Bwhat they are thinking, wanting, or feeling^. I can agree
with Slote that Bempathy enters into the functioning of assertion and asking a question
as speech acts^, however, it is useful to know if speech act as object of empathy is
isolable from other, non-propositional or even non-verbal signs that accompany
asserting or asking a question. For instance, if you are insincere or joking, I often
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know about it not from the content of assertion or question but from the tone of your
voice, your countenance etc. And bodily expression can tell even more. I suppose the
higher is the ability to empathize, the more accurate is recognition of what the speaker
not only asserts or ask but also, or first of all, intends to assert or to ask. Example
provided by Slote imply that he does not consider empathizing in this light, taking any
assertion or question bona fide.
In his last section Slote comes back to empathizing with someone else’s fear. Yet,
whereas in section 1 it was child’s empathizing with parent’s fear of snake, now it
concerns an adult’s empathizing with child’s fear of worms. He says: Bif one empath-
ically picks up on a child’s fear of worms but has independent reason to doubt the
dangerousness of worms, that may undercut the acquisition of any knowledge of or
reasonable belief about what the world is like^. Again, this is not what I am used to
consider as empathy which is not about, in the case mentioned, the dangerousness of
the world as apprehended mistakenly by the child in question; it is rather about feelings
of the child. His fear may be perceptible to many, but only he who empathizes with him
not only knows about his fear but also understands it. And not only he understands it
but also he is inclined to act in such a way as to improve that child’s condition if this is
morally possible or necessary (there is no need of improving a condition of a happy
person whom I empathize with or if I consider that the child will be better off if he
learns how to face his fear of that particular kind). Despite of possessing Bindependent
reason to doubt the dangerousness of worms^, I still understand why and how the child
fears worms. Finally, if we agree that empathy prompts to caring, an empathic person is
the one who is ready to help. One more time, the more empathic the person is, the better
he will help the child.
But now we are given what was absent is section 1, this is an epistemic criticism
going together with empathy. Why this difference? Criticism regarding the object of
feeling whom I empathize with is irrelevant because child’s fear as such is a different
object of empathizing than the object of this child’s fear, while in the case of the
dangerousness of the world the child has no resources to be critical of parent’s fear. Are
they two distinct concepts of empathy of which one is epistemically critical while the
other uncritical or do we deal with a single concept of empathy which is or is not
accompanied by an epistemic criticism? The two examples are so different that I think
that they refer to two distinct notions of empathy, not to two faces of empathy, or, as it
is presented by Slote, empathy plays a different role in children and in adults.
I do not know either how much such categories as osmosis, contagion, empathy,
sympathy and transmission, all used by Slote, converge and diverge (please remark that
in one sentence Slote uses empathy and sympathy interchangeably) and how each of
them operate in the realm of epistemology and moral philosophy. More importantly,
given three different descriptions of empathy I wonder if they are three faces of one
empathy concept or three different views of empathy, in fact, three distinct concepts. If
the former, it would be required to explain how they concur, given their contrasting or
contradictory features.
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